# Governance
Governance is an on-chain process by which members of the Nibiru Ecosystem can come to consensus and influence changes in the protocol by voting on "proposals". Participants can stake NIBI to vote on proposals and the amount of NIBI staked corresponds 1-to-1 with voting power.
# Lifecycle of a Proposal
Right to submit a proposal: Any NIBI holder, whether bonded or unbonded, can submit proposals by sending a TxGovProposal
transaction. Once a proposal is submitted, it is identified by its unique proposalID
.
The governance process is divided into the following steps:
- Proposal submission: Proposal is submitted to the blockchain with a deposit. Once deposit reaches the
MinDeposit
, the proposal is confirmed and the voting period opens.- Claiming deposit: Users that deposited on proposals can recover their deposits if the proposal is accepted OR if the proposal never enters the voting period.
- Vote: In the voting period, bonded NIBI holders (i.e. stakers) can then send
TxGovVote
transactions to vote on the proposal. When a threshold amount of support has been reached- Inheritance and penalties: Note that delegators inherit their validator's vote if they don't vote themselves.
- If the proposal involves a software upgrade:
- Signal: Validators start signaling that they are ready to switch to the new version.
- Switch: Once more than 75% of validators have signaled that they are ready to switch, their software automatically flips to the new version.
# ⚖️ — Deposit
To prevent spam, proposals must be submitted with a deposit in the coins defined in the MinDeposit
param. The voting period will not start until the proposal's deposit equals MinDeposit
.
When a proposal is submitted, it has to be accompanied by a deposit that must be strictly positive, but can be inferior to MinDeposit
. The submitter doesn't need to pay for the entire deposit on their own. If a proposal's deposit is inferior to MinDeposit
, other token holders can increase the proposal's deposit by sending a Deposit
transaction. The deposit is kept in an escrow in the governance ModuleAccount
until the proposal is finalized (passed or rejected).
Once the proposal's deposit reaches MinDeposit
, it enters voting period. If proposal's deposit does not reach MinDeposit
before MaxDepositPeriod
, proposal closes and nobody can deposit on it anymore.
# Deposit refund and burn
When a the a proposal finalized, the coins from the deposit are either refunded or burned, according to the final tally of the proposal:
- If the proposal is approved or if it's rejected but not vetoed, deposits will automatically be refunded to their respective depositor (transferred from the governance
ModuleAccount
). - When the proposal is vetoed with a supermajority, deposits be burned from the governance
ModuleAccount
.
# ⚖️ — Voting
# Participants
Participants are users that have the right to vote on proposals. On the Cosmos Hub, participants are bonded NIBI holders. Unbonded NIBI holders and other users do not get the right to participate in governance. However, they can submit and deposit on proposals.
Note that some participants can be forbidden to vote on a proposal under a certain validator if the participant has:
- bonded or unbonded NIBI to said validator after proposal entered voting period.
- become a validator after the proposal enters the voting period.
This does not prevent participant to vote with NIBI bonded to other validators. For example, suppose there are two validators: valA
and valB
. If a participant bonds some NIBI to valA
before a proposal enters voting period and bonds other NIBI to valB
after the proposal enters its voting period, only the vote under valB
will be forbidden.
# Voting period
Once a proposal reaches MinDeposit
, it immediately enters Voting period
. We define Voting period
as the interval between the moment the vote opens and the moment the vote closes. Voting period
should always be shorter than Unbonding period
to prevent double voting. The initial value of Voting period
is 2 weeks.
# Option set
The option set of a proposal refers to the set of choices a participant can choose from when casting its vote.
The initial option set includes the following options:
Yes
No
NoWithVeto
Abstain
NoWithVeto
counts as No
but also adds a Veto
vote. Abstain
option allows voters to signal that they do not intend to vote in favor or against the proposal but accept the result of the vote.
# Weighted Votes
ADR-037 introduces the weighted vote feature which allows a staker to split their votes into several voting options. For example, it could use 70% of its voting power to vote Yes and 30% of its voting power to vote No.
Often times the entity owning that address might not be a single individual. For example, a company might have different stakeholders who want to vote differently, and so it makes sense to allow them to split their voting power. Currently, it is not possible for them to do "passthrough voting" and giving their users voting rights over their tokens. However, with this system, exchanges can poll their users for voting preferences, and then vote on-chain proportionally to the results of the poll.
To represent weighted vote on chain, we use the following Protobuf (opens new window) message.
For a weighted vote to be valid, the options
field must not contain duplicate vote options, and the sum of weights of all options must be equal to 1.
References - Cosmos-SDK gov
module protos: [WeightedVoteOption] (opens new window) [Vote] (opens new window)
# Quorum
Quorum is defined as the minimum percentage of voting power that needs to be casted on a proposal for the result to be valid.
# Threshold
Threshold is defined as the minimum proportion of Yes
votes (excluding Abstain
votes) for the proposal to be accepted.
Initially, the threshold is set at 50% with a possibility to veto if more than 1/3rd of votes (excluding Abstain
votes) are NoWithVeto
votes. This means that proposals are accepted if the proportion of Yes
votes (excluding Abstain
votes) at the end of the voting period is superior to 50% and if the proportion of NoWithVeto
votes is inferior to 1/3 (excluding Abstain
votes).
# Inheritance
If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.
- If the delegator votes before its validator, it will not inherit from the validator's vote.
- If the delegator votes after its validator, it will override its validator vote with its own. If the proposal is urgent, it is possible that the vote will close before delegators have a chance to react and override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as proposals require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass before the end of the voting period. If more than 2/3rd of validators collude, they can censor the votes of delegators anyway.
# Validator’s punishment for non-voting
At present, validators are not punished for failing to vote.
# Governance address
Later, we may add permissioned keys that could only sign txs from certain modules. For the MVP, the Governance address
will be the main validator address generated at account creation. This address corresponds to a different PrivKey than the Tendermint PrivKey which is responsible for signing consensus messages. Validators thus do not have to sign governance transactions with the sensitive Tendermint PrivKey.
# ⚖️ — Software Upgrades
If proposals are of type SoftwareUpgradeProposal
, then nodes need to upgrade their software to the new version that was voted. This process is divided in two steps.
# Signal
After a SoftwareUpgradeProposal
is accepted, validators are expected to download and install the new version of the software while continuing to run the previous version. Once a validator has downloaded and installed the upgrade, it will start signaling to the network that it is ready to switch by including the proposal's proposalID
in its precommits.
Note: There is only one signal slot per precommit. If several SoftwareUpgradeProposals
are accepted in a short timeframe, a pipeline will form and they will be implemented one after the other in the order that they were accepted.
# Switch
Once a block contains more than 2/3rd precommits where a common SoftwareUpgradeProposal
is signaled, all the nodes (including validator nodes, non-validating full nodes and light-nodes) are expected to switch to the new version of the software.